There is an astonishingly high incidence of scandal among firms in the Chinese emerging market. This paper empirically examines whether certain corporate governance mechanisms are related to the probability of a firm being associated with corporate scandal. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms convicted for fraud, we find that firm ownership is related to the probability of a firm committing fraud, whereas other corporate governance characteristics such as board size, board independence, and institutional ownership are not. These findings suggest that in general governance mechanisms have not helped avoid serious corporate scandals in China. Further analysis indicates that the level of development of a country's legal system is related to the probability of a firm committing fraud. Together, our results suggest that without effective legal enforcement, corporate governance mechanisms will not be able to protect minority shareholders and facilitate stock market development in emerging markets.
Introduction
In many of the recent corporate scandals involving prominent U.S. and Western European companies such as Enron and Worldcom, the subject firms experienced a sharp decline in their debt issues' credit ratings. The scandals have largely been blamed on weak internal controls and governance. Accordingly, major regulatory changes have taken place. One such milestone is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which imposes a number of corporate governance requirements on all public companies with stock traded in the U.S.
While capital markets regulations of many countries tend to follow those established in the U.S., corporate scandals are far more common in many developing countries than in the U.S. The extent of such scandals is generally believed to have stymied the development of these countries' capital markets and in turn the progress of their economies. Thus, the degree to which governance mechanisms can mitigate corporate scandals is a question of particular importance for developing economies.
In this paper we examine the relations between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate scandals in China, the largest emerging economy in the world. Since China's stock market was established in 1990, more than 1,200 firms have listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Of these, approximately 200, or one-sixth, have been subject to enforcement actions by the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), or the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) --a ratio that is far higher than that observed in other countries, especially the U.S. The high incidence of securities violations has affected millions of investors and firm employees, contributing significantly to the loss of investor confidence and the resulting loss of value in the capital market. For example, the Chinese stock market composite index declined about 50% from 2001 to 2005. These observations naturally lead one to ask: 1) what contributes to the incidence of corporate scandals, and 2) can corporate governance mitigate corporate scandals in an emerging market such as China?
To address these questions, we assemble and analyze a unique data set that contains detailed information on the corporate governance characteristics of two samples of firms, namely, a sample of 160 Chinese listed firms that according to CSRC, SZSE, or SHSE had commit a securities law violation during the 1993 to 2003 period and an industry-size matched control sample of 160 non-scandal firms. The definition of (financial) violation employed in this paper is that used by CSRC, SZSE, and SHSE to identify a breach of securities laws and rules. Note that due to weak legal enforcement in China, such violations represent cases of outright fraud or other illegal activities as only serious violations of law are investigated and enforced by the authorities; minor violations or violations that would be difficult to prosecute are not formally enforced by the authorities in China.
We find evidence of a non-linear relationship between the ownership share of the largest shareholder and the probability that a firm will commit fraud. Specifically, the firm is less likely to commit fraud as the ownership share of the largest shareholder increases from a low level, but the firm is more likely to commit fraud after the largest shareholder's ownership share reaches a certain threshold. In contrast, we find no evidence of a relation between the probability that a firm will commit fraud and several other governance characteristics, including board size, board independence, and institutional ownership. These findings suggest that, in general, corporate governance mechanisms alone may not be able to mitigate corporate scandals in China.
A number of factors besides corporate governance may influence a firm's decision to commit fraud. For example, the likelihood and potential costs of being caught are likely to affect the decision of whether to engage in mismanagement.
These variables are related to a country's level of legal and economic development.
While prior literature discusses the relations between corporate governance and earnings management (e.g., Klein (2002) ), SEC enforcement (e.g., Beasley (1996) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) ), or accounting restatements (Agrawal and Chadha (2003) ) in the U.S., few studies examine the relations between corporate governance, a country's level of legal development, and the extent of corporate fraud.
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The literature following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) is a close exception, as it focuses on differences in legal systems across countries.
However, no prior study looks at the effects of within-country variation in legal development on corporate fraud. In China, different regions observe very different levels of economic development as indicated by the variation in province-level GDP per capita. Moreover, although written law is similar for most regions in China, the degree of enforcement, or the effectiveness of the legal system, varies significantly from region to region (Alford (2000) and Lu and Yao (2004) ). This paper adds to the literature by using the variation in China to empirically test the effects of economic and legal development on a firm's decision to commit fraud.
We find that in regions in which the number of commercial cases in a province investigated by the procurator (similar to the prosecutor in U.S.) scaled by the province's GDP is larger, that is, in regions in which the procuratorate is not effective, a firm in the region is more likely to commit fraud. This finding suggests that when the procuratorate system is not effective, a firm is more likely to commit fraud if a number of other firms in the same "neighborhood" also are committing fraud. In addition, we find a non-linear relation between the number of commercial cases per capita that are tried in a region's court and the probability that a firm in that region will commit fraud: the probability that a firm in a given region will commit fraud increases in the number of commercial suits per capita in the region's court up to a certain level, after which point it decreases. This finding suggests that as the court system becomes effective and hence more people and firms turn to the courts for legal protection, firms will be constrained in their ability to commit fraud.
Overall, the evidence suggests that in the Chinese emerging market, legal development is a more important factor than corporate governance mechanisms in influencing whether a firm chooses to commit fraud. In other words, due to the weak legal system, corporate governance mechanisms are not effective in China. These findings are consistent with Sun and Zhang (2006) , who examine the management turnover associated with fraud They find that while firms associated with fraud have higher management turnover than matching non-fraud firms, a large percentage of the departing managers move to management positions in other firms and many even receive a promotion; only a very small fraction of CEOs and Chairmen receive legal or administrative penalties. Sun and Zhang argue that the weak enforcement of law has led to rampant fraud and stagnancy in the Chinese stock market. In this paper we show further that the absence of effective legal enforcement limits the ability of corporate governance mechanisms to mitigate corporate fraud.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses corporate fraud in China and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Issues and hypotheses
In this section we discuss corporate fraud in China and we develop testable hypotheses. We first address the relationship between corporate governance and corporate fraud. We then discuss the association between legal development and corporate violations.
Corporate governance and corporate scandal
In this subsection, we discuss the relations between a number of corporate governance mechanisms and corporate scandal in China. In particular, we examine the ownership share of the largest shareholder, board size, board independence, and the role of institutional investors.
Ownership
The degree of ownership concentration affects the nature of contracting. When ownership is diffuse, as is typical in the U.S., agency problems arise from the conflict of interest between outside shareholders and managers (Jensen and Merckling (1976) ).
On the other hand when ownership is concentrated, as is the case in Asia, the nature of the agency problem shifts away from manager-shareholder conflicts toward conflicts between the large shareholder (who is also the manager) and minority shareholders.
One way to mitigate agency problems of the latter type is to increase the large shareholder's ownership stake in the firm, as the literature shows that a higher ownership stake makes it more costly to expropriate the firm for private benefit. Based on this argument we expect that as the largest shareholder's ownership stake increases, the firm is less likely to be associated with a corporate scandal. More formally,
H1A:
As the ownership of the largest shareholder increases from zero, a firm is less likely to commit fraud.
However, the relation between the probability of a firm committing fraud and ownership share is likely to be non-linear. Claenssens et al. (2000) , Claenssens et al. (2002), and Fan and Wong (2002) show that dominance of the largest shareholder is among the most important characteristics of ownership structure in Asia. This is particularly true in China, where there is no effective mechanism to monitor or restrain large shareholders: by securing a dominant position in control rights, large shareholders can more easily expropriate minority shareholders. Accordingly, we expect that the following relation exists.
H1B:
As the ownership stake of the largest shareholder increases over a certain level, the firm is more likely to commit fraud.
Board independence
Fama and Jensen (1983) theorize that the board of directors is the highest internal control mechanism responsible for monitoring the actions of senior management.
Moreover, they suggest that a higher percentage of outside directors increases a board's monitoring effectiveness. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) , Beasley (1996) , and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) find a similar relation between board composition and monitoring effectiveness. Consistent with these arguments, China's regulatory authorities require that listed firms include independent directors on their boards. Given the dominance of the largest shareholders in Chinese listed firms, the ratio of independent directors on a board may be of particular importance. However, because the CEO or Chairman has discretion to select members of the board, many of the independent directors are actually friends of management, that is, many "independent" directors are not really independent. The press has reported on a number of cases in which independent directors did nothing to resolve a conflict between insiders and minority shareholders.
Given the above discussion, it is important to empirically examine whether in China independent directors are really independent and whether independent directors can decrease a firm's tendency to commit fraud. We do so by testing the following hypothesis:
H2:
The proportion of independent members on the board of directors is lower for firms involved in a corporate scandal than for non-scandal firms.
We also consider factors other than board composition that might also influence the board's effectiveness in monitoring the actions of management. Jensen (1993) argues that boards of director are ineffectual monitors when the board is too large, when the board's equity ownership is small, and when the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board. . We therefore take into consideration board size, whether the Chairman of the Board is also the CEO, the number or proportion of shareholding directors on the Board, the number or proportion of paid directors on the Board, and the shareholdings of the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Specifically, we empirically examine the relations between each of these variables and the likelihood that a firm will be involved in a corporate scandal.
Institutional holdings
Institutional investors may help mitigate agency costs and prevent corporate misconduct when they actively monitor a firm's decisions. As Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) show, institutional shareholders tend to disfavor firms that decrease shareholder value. Moreover, compared to other types of investors, institutional investors tend to pursue the stocks of firms that continuously disclose information (Healy et al. (1999) and Bushee and Noe (2000) ).
However, in an emerging economy with a less developed legal system, institutional investors may be incentivized to collude with management in pursuit of private interests. For instance, management may offer institutional investors benefits such as a lower-than-market transaction price, efforts to prevent close-end fund buybacks, and underwriting or consulting contracts (see, e.g., Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993)).
In China, the press and the CSRC have documented cases in which mutual funds have manipulated the stock price, colluded with firm management, and made illegal profits by trading based on inside information. We examine empirically whether on net institutional investors in China help prevent corporate scandals or whether they tend collude with managers committing corporate securities violations.
Level of legal development
Fraud is far more common in China than in the U.S. or other developed economies, in spite of the fact that the Chinese authorities have modeled their corporate governance policies on those employed in the U.S. and Western Europe.
That the standard corporate governance mechanisms are not effective in Chinese firms could be due to China's less developed legal systems. . A country's legal system and the extent to which laws are enforced are likely to have great impact on a firm's decision to commit fraud. Previous literature documents that a country's legal system is a primary determinant of the country's financial development and economic growth (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); Levine (1998)). Allen , Qian, and Qian (2002) (2005) find further that the cost of capital rises in countries that introduce, but do not enforce, insider trading laws. They therefore argue that under certain conditions, no law is better than a good law without the execution of the law. In China, the formal protections written into law have improved significantly and are among the most advanced across developing countries. For example, the Securities Act of China models its requirements on those that have evolved in the U.S. and other developed markets. However, because the enforcement of law in China has lagged behind, Alford (2000) and Lu and Yao (2004) point out that it is insufficient to look only at China's formal laws when evaluating the Chinese legal system.
We extend the studies above by examining the impact of law enforcement, or effectiveness, on the probability of a firm committing fraud. Unlike most other countries, different regions in China observe different levels of legal effectiveness although the written laws are nearly the same throughout the country. The extent of enforcement influences both the actions of management and a board's effectiveness as a monitor of management. In particular, weak legal systems are unable to curb fraud by managers because the probability of being caught is low and the penalties are not severe in the event a manager is caught. Put differently, under a weak legal system, minority investors are not likely to spend time suing management in court because the probability of winning the case is low or the expected compensation of doing so is too low cover expenses and opportunity costs involved with litigation.
Based upon the above discussions, in this paper we hypothesize that the level of a region's legal development influence the likelihood that firms located in the region will commit financial fraud.
H3: In a region with a better-developed legal system, firms are less likely to commit fraud.2.1.5 Financial distress
Of potential concern is the possibility that firms facing financial distress are more likely to commit financial fraud. For example, management may try to hide information in the hope that earnings would recover soon. Thus, in our empirical tests we control for the likelihood of financial distress. We expect that firms facing financial distress are more likely to commit financial statement fraud.
Data and variables

Sample selection and description
While publicly listed firms represent only a small portion of China's economy, and unlisted firms have a higher likelihood of committing financial fraud than listed firms, we mainly focus on listed firms due to data availability. Our sample consists of 320 publicly traded firms. Of these, 160 are "scandal firms," that is, firms convicted by CSRC, SZSE, or SHSE for a securities violation during the 1993 to 2003 period.
Each of the scandal firms is then size and industry matched with a no-scandal firm, creating a choice-based sample of 160 fraud and 160 no-fraud firms.
The scandal firm sample is identified according to CSRC, SHSE, and SZSE enforcement action releases. In particular, a firm is included in the initial scandal sample if, in any action release over the sample period, the CSRC, SHSE, or SZSE accused top management of violating the China Securities Act. Violations include false statements of profits or assets, false forecasts, intentional omission of material information, illegal transactions with large shareholders, and illegal guarantees of loans.
2 The enforcement action releases are available in the major newspapers and securities exchanges bulletins of CSRC, SHSE, and SZSE. CSRC also requires that convicted firms announce their convictions to investors. We use these corporate announcements to double-check our sample identified by the action releases.
Note that some firms were subject to more than one enforcement action during the 1993 to 2003 period for different offenses. In such cases we focus on the first conviction of the firm, as previous events may have a residual carryover effect and multiple events may bias a firm's financials, management turnover, and corporate governance. The total number of firms subject to an enforcement action by the CSRC, SSE, or SZSE between 1993 and 2003 is 178. Of these, we eliminate 12 firms whose governance information around or before the fraud event is not available, 2 firms listed on China's B-Share Market, and 4 firms that cannot be matched by industry
code. This leaves a final sample of 160 scandal firms. Among these 160 firms, 53 commit a securities violation lasting 2 or more accounting years; we identify these firms' violations according to the first date of the violation. For each of the 160 firms in the scandal sample, we identify a control firm.
Control firms are obtained by the following four-step procedure. First, they are matched by stock exchange: the common stock of a fraud firm and its matched no-fraud firm must trade on the same national stock exchange (SHSE, SZSE). Second, they are matched by industry: fraud and matched no-fraud firms must share the same 3-digit industrial code; if no match is available at the 3-digit level, then a matching firm is determined based upon the primary 2-digit code. Third, controls are matched by firm size: matched no-fraud firms have the closest total assets with their scandal-sample counterparts. Finally, control firms are matched by time period: a no-fraud firm identified in the first three steps is included in the final sample if proxy and financial statement data are available for the time period used to collect financial data for the scandal firm.
Using an almost identical sample, Sun and Zhang (2006) calculate the abnormal stock returns around regulatory announcements. They document a negative abnormal return of -0.014 for the scandal firms in the window (-1,1), where day 0 is the announcement day. Due to space considerations, we do not duplicate their calculation in this paper. Wu and Gao (2002) report similar results. Sun and Zhang also find that matched control firms experience operating performance improvements relative to scandal firms over the interval from year -1 to year 2, where year 0 is the year in which the scandal is committed. Again, due to space limitations, we do not duplicate these results in our study.
Variables
In order to test our hypotheses, in this section we construct measures of the variables identified in the discussions above.
Measures of corporate governance
We collect data on corporate governance from SinoFin and CSMAR. Where observations are not available in SinoFin and CSMAR, we refer to the firm's statements and proclamations. We use data the last period before a fraud incident for empirical analysis. Specifically, the proxies we use for corporate governance are as given below:
CHAIRCEO: A dummy variable that equals 1 if a single person is both
Chairman of the Board and CEO at the same time, and 0 otherwise.
BOARDSIZE:
The number of members on the board of directors.
INDEPENDENT:
The ratio of independent directors to board size.
CHAIRHOLD: Ownership share of the Chairman of the Board.
HOLDDIR:
The ratio of directors holding shares to board size.
LARGEST:
The ownership of the largest stockholder.
INSTITUTE: Institutional holdings.
GROUP: Group affiliation; a dummy variable equals to 1 if the listed firm is affiliated with a group, and 0 otherwise.
Measures of legal development
The measures for legal development consist of three sets of proxies, which come 
OFFICPC:
The number of officials at the county level 3 or above that are convicted in commercial cases initiated by the procurator divided by the population in a province. This variable is a measure of the degree of corruption among officials.
The second set of proxies are based on data from China's court system.
RCMP:
The number of commercial cases received by the court per capita (millions). RCMP serves several purposes. First, it controls for the court's selection of easy cases. Second, to the extent that people in a province with low trust in the court system tend not to turn to the courts as a way to resolve conflicts, RCMP controls for the public's trust in the court system. Third, because arbitrary court rulings tend to deter people from taking cases to the court, RCMP also controls for the court's record for arbitrary rulings.
RCMPSQ:
The square of RCMP.
CASECLOSE:
The case-close rate across all the commercial courts in a year.
The third set of proxies focus on China's lawyers.
LAWYPC:
The number of registered lawyers divided by the population (in 10 thousand) in a province.
LAWYGDP:
The number of registered lawyers divided by the GDP in a province.
In addition, we use GDP per capita as a proxy for economic development. Data on economic development come from China Statistical Yearbook (CSY). More specifically,
LGDPPC: The logarithm of GDP (in 100 million Chinese yuan) of a province in the period before a violation divided by the population (in 10 thousand) in the same period.
We also construct proxies designed to measure financial development. The data are from China Financial Statistical Yearbook (CFSY) and China Investment Yearbook (CIY).
PRINVEST: Private investment, calculated as the total investment in fixed assets in a province less the investment in fixed assets made by state-owned enterprises and collective firms. This proxy is not a perfect measure of private investment because some collective firms are actually privately operated (the so-called "red hat" firms);
nonetheless, it should serve our purpose with reasonable accuracy.
FINCOMP:
The proportion of credit issued by local financial institutions to the total amount of credit. This variable serves as a measure of financial competition. We obtain the credit issued by local financial institutions by subtracting the credit issued by the four major state banks 4 from the total amount of credit issued.
Finally, we employ the NERI Index of Marketization of China's Provinces, which ranks the Chinese provinces according to their level of market development, as a comprehensive measure of a province's level of economic, financial, and legal development. The index has five components: (i) The relation between government and the market; (ii) the development of the non-state-owned economy; (iii) the development of product markets; (iv) the development of factor markets; and (v) the development of legal and regulatory intermediary institutions.
Other control variables
It is possible that firms facing financial distress are more likely to be involved in a corporate scandal. We therefore need to control for a firm's financial situation. To do so, we use a firm's debt to equity ratio, the liquidity (current assets to current liability), and ROA (return on assets) as several basic controls. We also use several other controls widely used in the financial distress and bankruptcy literature.
Also, besides corporate governance, external auditing may have an impact on firm's decision to commit fraud. We therefore control for the auditor's reputation by including BIGFOUR, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the auditor is one of the international Big Four firms (formerly Big Five), and 0 otherwise.
Empirical results
Regressions on corporate governance variables
We estimate variants of the following model:
(1) SCANDAL = f (corporate governance proxies, financial controls), where the explanatory variables are the corporate governance variables discussed in Section 3.2.1 and the financial controls discussed in Section 3.2.4. As we discussed in Section 2, the signs on most of these variables' coefficients are empirical issues. Thus, we use the observed signs to interpret our results. Table 3 reports estimates of OLS and logistic regressions of equation (1), where we include different corporate governance variables of interest together with control variables. Column 1 shows that none of the governance variables is statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on the largest shareholder's ownership stake, LARGEST, is negative but statistically insignificant. In Column 2, we include LARGESTSQ, the squared ownership of the largest shareholder, together with LARGEST. In this case LARGEST is negative and statistically significant, and LARGESTSQ is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that as the ownership share of the largest shareholder increases from a low level, the firm is less likely to commit scandal. This is consistent with hypothesis H1A, which posits that increasing the largest shareholder's stake can mitigate the agency problem. However, after the ownership of the large shareholder reaches a certain level, the firm is more likely to commit scandal as the ownership of the largest shareholder continues to increase. This is consistent with hypothesis H1B, which posits that entrenched large shareholders may expropriate minority shareholders. Also in Column 2, CHIRHOLD is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The negative sign of CHIRHOLD suggests that when the Chairman's stockholdings increase, the firm is less likely to commit a securities fraud.
Columns 3 through 6 report results of logistic regressions. These results confirm those in Columns 1 and 2. Specifically, similar to Column 1, Columns 3 and 5 indicated that none of the governance variables is statistically significant at the 10% level, and the coefficient on LARGEST is negative but not statistically significant. In addition, similar to Column 2, in Columns 4 and 6, we include LARGESTSQ together with LARGEST and find that LARGEST is negative and statistically significant, whereas LARGESTSQ is positive and statistically significant. Thus, the logistic tests also records a non-linear relation between the largest shareholder's ownership share and the likelihood that a firm will commit fraud, providing additional evidence in support of hypotheses H1A and H1B.
We do not find that the other corporate governance variables we study have a significant impact on a firm's probability of committing fraud. In particular, there is no evidence that the presence of independent directors on a board decreases the probability of a firm being associated with a scandal. This is not consistent with hypothesis H2, and suggests that so-called "independent" directors may not really be independent. Further, board size and the ratio of stockholding directors are not significantly related to the probability of a firm committing fraud. Whether the CEO is also the acting Chairman has no significant impact as well. Finally, we find no evidence that institutional investors decrease the probability that a firm will commit fraud. This suggests that unlike the role of institutional investors in the U. The results are all similar to those in Table 3 . in part to the fact that in their regression models they do not include the square of the largest shareholder's ownership share. As we show in Table 3 , the relation between fraud and ownership share is not linear: when both ownership and its square are included in the regressions, we find that ownership is important in explaining corporate securities violations. Chen et al. also do not control for institutional holdings, which is an important factor in explaining fraud.
Other controls
It is possible that firms in financial distress are more likely to commit fraud in order to survive the distress. In all regressions in Table 3 , we use three variables to control for financial distress, namely, DEBT (debt to equity), LIQUIDITY (current assets to current liabilities), and ROA. We find that LIQUIDITY is statistically significant in all regressions. Thus, when a firm is safer in terms of short-term solvency, the firm is less likely to commit scandal. With respect to ROA, it is significant or close to significant in some regressions. Thus, when a firm's ROA is high, the firm is more profitable and less likely to commit a securities violation.
Finally, turning to BIGFOUR, we find that BIGFOUR is negative but not significant in all regressions. This suggests that the international Big Four auditing firms may not be effective external monitors for Chinese firms, and hence are not able to help avoid corporate scandals.
Regressions on variables for regional marketization, legal system development, and economic development
We first examine the relation between a region's marketization and a firm's tendency to commit fraud. Column 1 of Table 4 reports the regression results. We see that Marketization is negative but not statistically significant. Because it is possible that an index is too broad measure, we examine more specific factors.
Recall that we construct three sets of measures of the effectiveness of the legal system in China. The first set of variables is based on procuratorate system. In
Column 2 of Table 4 , we include PROCUGDP, the ratio of the number of commercial cases initiated by the procurator in a province to the province's GDP. The coefficient on PROCUGDP is positive and significant. Thus, as the ratio of the number of commercial cases initiated by the procurator to the GDP of a province increases, a firm in the region is more likely to commit fraud. This observation is not consistent with the conventional wisdom that a large number of commercial cases per capita indicates that a legal system is effectively deterring firms from commit violations. In China, the legal system, especially the procuratorate system, is insufficient, with only a small portion of illegal activities formally being brought to court by the procurators.
Thus, in this context, a large number of commercial cases per capita is evidence not of an effective legal system, but rather of the extent of illegal activities. Consequently, as the number of commercial cases in a province initiated by the procurator scaled by the province's GDP increases, a firm in the region is more likely to commit scandal. This suggests there exists an externality effect whereby a firm is more likely to follow others and commit fraud when there exist more illegal activities in a "neighborhood."
In untabulated results, we also include OFFICPC in regressions, but its coefficient is not significant.
The second set of legal development variables are based on China's court system.
In Column 3 of Table 4 , we include RCMP, the number of commercial suits per capita received by the court in a province, and its square, RCMPSQ. The coefficient on RCMP is positive and significant and the coefficient on RCMPSQ is negative and significant. Thus, as the number of commercial cases per capita received by the court of a province increases, a firm in the region is more likely to commit fraud. However, as the number of commercial cases per capita received by the court of a province continues to increase beyond a certain level, the probability that a firm in the region will commit fraud drops. This suggests that when the number of commercial cases per capita received by the court of a province is at a low level, the court system is not effective, likely because many people choose not to seek redress or protection in the courts. Zhang and Ke (2002) collect data on economic and commercial suits in a local court in China and find that there exists an adverse selection problem. Two phenomena exist at the same time: a high rate of default on contracts and a high rate of recovery for plaintiffs in judgments. Zhang and Ke argue that the high recovery rate for plaintiffs indicates the ineffectiveness of the court system in China. When a court system is ineffective, people will only initiate suits if the probability of winning the case is high; thus, in this context the higher RCMP indicates that there exist many more violations or defaults than those brought to court. However, when the court system becomes better developed, more people will choose to go to court and the number of commercial cases per capita received by the court of a province will increase. As the court system becomes effective, firms in the region will be less likely to commit scandal. Thus we find an inverse U-shaped relation between the probability of a firm committing a violation and the RCMP.
Looking at the RCMP data more closely, we find that there is huge variation in RCMP across provinces. The provinces with the highest RCMP are the more developed provinces including Shanghai and Zhejiang. These provinces have dramatically higher RCMP that less developed provinces. This supports our argument.
Though not reported we also include CASECLOSE, the case-close rate in commercial cases, in our regressions. The coefficient for CASECLOSE is not significant. This is due to little variation in CASECLOSE after mid-1990, when the China Super Court required all regional courts to improve the case-close rate in commercial cases.
In Column 4 of Table 4 , we include PROCUGDP, RCMP, and RCMPSQ in the regression model together. We examine how the combination of two essential components in China's legal system, the procurorate system and the court system, affect the incidence of corporate scandals. We find that as the ratio of the number of commercial cases initiated by the procurator to the GDP of a province increases, a firm in the region is more likely to commit fraud. Further, as RCMP increases from a very low level, a firm in the region is more likely to commit scandal, whereas after RCMP reaches a certain level, the probability that a firm in the region will commit a violation declines.
In Column 5, in addition to procurorate system and court system, we include the impact of lawyers in regressions. The results are similar to those of Column 4 in terms of the impact of the procurorate system and the court system on corporate scandals.
However, LAWYGDP is not significant. This is consistent with perceptions that lawyers have limited impact on the effectiveness of law in China, even though the number of lawyers has grown significantly during the past decade. Though not reported, the results are similar when we include LAWPC.
In Column 6, the GDP per capita of a province is negative and significant. In a region with higher GDP per capita, a firm is less likely to commit fraud. This suggests that when a region is more economically developed, firms in that region are less likely to commit scandals. This may also be due to the fact that a more developed economy enjoys more open flow of information, which decreases the costs of monitoring management. However, there may be an endogeneity issue in that more firms committing fraud in a region is likely to lead to lower GDP per capita in the region.
Regressions on variables for regional financial system development
It is possible that the level of financial system development may affect a firm's probability of committing fraud in that if firms are not able to raise capital in a less developed financial system, they may have an incentive to commit a violation in order to obtain access to capital. Thus, we examine the relation between the level of a region's financial system development and the probability of a firm in the region committing fraud.
In Column 1 of Table 5 , we include FINCOMP, the ratio of the proportion of credit issued by local financial institutions to the total amount of credit, to measure the extent of financial competition. While traditionally the four major banks in China have extended most of the bank loans, local financial institutions have grown rapidly in recent years. The coefficient on FINCOMP is negative but statistically insignificant.
In Column 2, we include PRINVEST, the ratio of private investment to total investments, as a measure of financial liberalization. The coefficient of PRINVEST is negative but not significant. In Column 3, we include FINCOMP and PRINVEST together; both are not significant. In Column 4, we include legal proxies, RCMP, and FINCOMP; the coefficient on FINCOMP is negative but statistically insignificant, but consistent with the results in the previous section, RCMP has a significant impact on the incidence of corporate scandals. In sum, there is no evidence that financial development is related to a firm's probability of committing a securities violation.
Conclusions
We examine whether certain corporate governance mechanisms are related to the incidence of corporate scandal in Chinese listed firms. We find that while ownership is related to the probability of a firm committing fraud, there is no evidence that other corporate governance characteristics such as board size, board independence, and institutional ownership are related to the probability of a firm committing fraud. The
Chinese government has required listed firms to use corporate governance mechanisms developed in the U.S. and other developed markets. However, we find no evidence that these mechanisms can help Chinese firms avoid corporate scandals.
Corporate governance may not be the only issue related to a firm's propensity to commit fraud in an emerging market. Indeed, we find that in a region in which the number of commercial cases investigated by procurator is larger, a firm in the region is more likely to commit fraud. This observation suggests that when the procuratorate system is not effective, a firm is more likely to commit fraud if more firms in its "neighborhood" are doing so. In addition, we find a non-linear relation between the number of commercial cases per capita that are tried in a region's court and the probability of a firm in that region committing fraud: as the number of commercial suits per capita tried in a province's court increases from low levels, the probability of a firm committing fraud increases; however, when the number of commercial suits per capita tried in a region's court reaches a certain level, the probability of a firm committing fraud falls. This finding suggests that when a region's court system becomes effective and more people and firms turn to court for legal protection, firms will be constrained in their ability to commit fraud. Finally, we find that the level of a region's economic development is negatively related to the probability of a firm in the region committing fraud: as a region's GDP per capita increases, a firm in the region will be less likely to be involved in a scandal. CHAIRHOLD is the ownership share of the Chairman of the Board. HOLDDIR is the ratio of directors holding shares to board size. LARGEST is the ownership share of the largest stockholder. LARGESTSQ is the square of the ownership share of the largest stockholder. INSTITUTE is institutional holdings.
GROUP is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is affiliated with a group, and 0 otherwise. BIGFOUR is a dummy equal to 1 if the auditor of the firm is one of international Big Four firms, and 0 otherwise.
DEBT is the debt to equity ratio. LIQUIDITY is current assets to current liabilities. ROA is return on assets. The z statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. CHAIRHOLD is the ownership share of the Chairman of the Board. HOLDDIR is the ratio of directors holding shares to board size. LARGEST is the ownership share of the largest stockholder. LARGESTSQ is the square of the ownership share of the largest stockholder. INSTITUTE is institutional holdings.
MARKETIZATION is the NERI Index of level of marketization of a province.
LGDPPC is the logarithm of GDP (in 100 million Chinese yuan) of a province divided by the population (in 10 thousand). PROCUGDP is ratio of the number of commercial cases initiated by the procurator in a province to the province's GDP. RCMP is the number of commercial cases received by the court per capita (millions). RCMPSQ is the square of RCMP. LAWYGDP is the number of registered lawyers divided by the GDP in a province. DEBT is the debt to equity ratio. LIQUIDITY is current assets to current liabilities. ROA is return on assets. The z statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. amount of credit in a province. PRINVEST is the proportion of fixed-asset investment made by private enterprises to the total amount of fixed-asset investment in a province. DEBT is the debt to equity ratio.
LIQUIDITY is current assets to current liabilities. ROA is return on assets. The z statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
